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laws and old procedures obstruct the way to justice in an  evolving 
and developing society: a society that gives to the individual his 
rightful place o f dignity as a freeman equal to all his fellow men and 
where he shall have the right to live under a rule o f law based on 
a sense o f obligation. In tha t society respect for law m ust be the 
cohesive force holding it together and not mere obedience based 
on a surrender to the weapons o f state power. T hat as I see it is the 
goal you seek in your quest for justice.
TH E Q UEST FO R JUSTICE 
Allan F. Sm ithf
It is a great pleasure for me to participate in this symposium 
on “ The Quest for Justice” . As your chairm an has indicated, I 
severed my direct association with legal education and with the 
legal profession some three years ago, to assume a  position in 
general university adm inistration. And, if there is one recurring 
element of nostalgia for the life that was, it is nostalgia for the 
association with lawyers, with legal educators, with law students. 
Accordingly, I welcome this chance to speak concerning, and to 
listen to a discussion of, a subject which occupied my time for so 
long a period.
The title o f the symposium—The Quest for Justice—is an 
intriguing one. Somehow, in four words, those who chose the title 
have captured the essence o f some fundamental notions o f which 
lawyers and laymen need to be continually reminded. We are 
reminded, for example, o f the fact that “justice,” as a concept, is 
a goal which society must perennially seek. It is both a societal and 
a personal goal. The term invokes an image of behavioral patterns 
which run the gamut from close interpersonal relations (justice in the 
family) to the broadest relationships between the individual and 
society as a whole (justice in the courts). These daily relationships 
are simply a part o f life, and the search for making them  both 
tolerable and acceptable is a part o f the quest for justice.
We are also reminded by the title that justice is never fully 
attained. It is always a goal which retreats in front o f those who 
pursue it. We attain  justice in a given area only to find th a t the view 
of justice from our new vantage point (the definition o f justice if 
you will) has enlarged so that the quest is now even broader than
t  Vice-President for Academic Affairs, University o f Michigan.
12 U.N.B. LAW  JOURNAL
when we started and perhaps even more urgently required. I do 
not mean to imply that justice is a will-of-the-wisp which often 
fades from  view and has no substance. Quite the contrary. It is a 
goal which is very real, and which always has some rather clearly 
visible elements toward which specific steps can be taken. Rather, 
I suggest only that behind, or beside, the clearly visible elements 
there are ill-defined elements which come into focus only when 
we have successfully mastered those which were already clearly 
visible. Illustrations are not hard to find. At one time in the history 
o f the United States, it became clear that society, in its efforts to 
control some portions o f our economy, needed a system o f fact­
finding and adjudication quite different from that which was pro­
vided by our court system. Justice, as then perceived, was not being 
achieved. The resulting efforts produced a system of administrative 
tribunals, operating to bring justice to the people and the institutions 
involved. It succeeded. But as soon as these elements of justice had 
been achieved, there appeared on the horizon the necessity for new 
mechanisms to guard against adm inistrative arbitrariness, and the 
concept o f justice was broadened to embrace new goals, new be­
havior patterns, new relationships.
I have probably belabored the point excessively. I am saying 
no more than this: that the concept o f justice has always been in­
capable of precise and enduring definition; that its content changes 
as society changes, and as human objectives change; that we must 
be prepared, therefore, to seek justice constantly, with full recogni­
tion that the search can never be totally ended.
Let me turn, then, from these observations about the title of 
the symposium to some matters o f more specific content. If it be 
true that there is a constant quest for justice, it may be appropriate 
to ask: what is the present focus of the search? Where are the 
presently discernible elements which are demanding attention, and 
what, perhaps, are the ill-defined elements which lurk in the back­
ground ?
H ad I been asked to speak on such a subject ten years ago, 
or perhaps even five years ago, I am quite certain that my mind 
would have turned to a fairly traditional legal framework of analysis, 
familiar to all lawyers. I would have let my mind dwell, probably 
exclusively, upon subjects o f substantive law and procedural law. I 
would have asked what reforms in our laws are required to meet 
current standards of justice. Should we, perhaps, have new rules 
by which we judge the conduct o f a doctor who has engaged in 
heart transplants? W hat does “justice” require now by way of 
rules o f conduct concerning abortions? W hat does justice require 
in controlling the operation o f the stock m arket? W hat modifica­
tions o f a jury system, which has served us well for centuries, are
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now required for the attainm ent o f justice? W hat reform in court 
procedure can be suggested to speed the processes o f adjudication 
lest delay o f justice turn out in fact to be a denial o f justice? W hat 
impediments to justice, if any, are imposed by the members o f the 
legal profession itself as it controls entry to and performance within 
that profession? Is it possible to change the whole concept and 
operation o f our liability insurance in autom obile accident cases to 
a system which eliminates “ fault” from having any place in the 
system and merely reimburses proven economic loss as is generally 
the case with fire insurance? W ould this be justice? Are the laws 
and procedures governing managem ent-labor relations properly 
designed to encourage and sustain economic justice?
A long catalog o f such questions could be propounded, and 
they are the regular grist for the lawyers, the legal educators, the 
judges and the legislators who seek to refine and improve the legal 
system through which we traditionally adm inister our legal justice. 
They are ever present. They are some of the reasons why one may 
assert that the quest for justice never ends and is never totally 
successful. And, quite frankly, I would like to discuss such questions, 
for it is terribly im portant tha t they be asked and that answers be 
sought. Law schools, and the legal profession, would be delinquent 
in the performance o f their function if they did not give unremitting 
attention to the myriad o f such questions which we face. Tonight, 
I note, the whole subject o f law reform is part o f the agenda for 
this occasion, and it will be on many agendas in the future.
But, despite my own desires and despite the benefit which might 
flow from a consideration o f questions o f that kind, I would like 
to tu rn  attention to another viewpoint, for it seems clear that the 
concept o f justice is being broadened in ways which transcend the 
type o f problems just mentioned. I cannot help thinking o f a story 
about a golf professional. He was standing at his place o f business 
when two ladies approached him. “ G ood m orning,” he addressed 
one o f them, “ W ould you like to learn to play golf?” “ N o,” she 
replied. “ My friend wants to learn. I learned yesterday.”
It is possible that the skills required for the game o f golf are 
sufficiently enduring that that which was learned yesterday will 
suffice for today and tom orrow. But there are not many areas of 
knowledge where such a condition obtains. The explosion o f know­
ledge, the spectacular rate o f its growth, the massive and rapid 
social changes which are taking place are rendering obsolete much 
o f our learning and many o f our skills. Equally im portant is the 
fact that the changes are affecting and modifying the values and the 
goals o f the society in the United States, and perhaps elsewhere. 
And it is here, I think, that many people in my country, at least, 
are broadening the concept o f justice beyond those matters related
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to judicial and quasi-judicial activities. The term “justice” is being 
used with all sorts o f adjective modifiers—“ social justice,” “ economic 
justice,” “ personal justice,” to name some. And when these adjectives 
are added, it is clear tha t the implication is to broaden the applic­
ability o f the term “justice” to m atters which only indirectly touch 
the operations o f courts.
I suppose there is no reason to be surprised at this development. 
No dictionary provides a single definition o f “justice” for the term 
does not lend itself to confinement. One finds a definition: “ Adminis­
tration of law, according to the rules of law or equity.”  This is the 
ordinary meaning—the traditional concept—the focus usually 
adopted by lawyers. But one will also find a definition which reads 
something like this: “ The principle o f rectitude and just dealing of 
men with each other—one of the cardinal virtues.” It seems to me 
tha t the focus o f large segments o f our population in the United 
States is upon the latter definition, and the shift o f focus explains 
in part some o f the unrest we observe, some of the turm oil which 
exists in our political, social, and legislative institutions. Problems 
o f every kind and description are being weighed and analyzed in 
terms o f justice—the principle o f just dealing o f men with each 
other. The quest is broadened and the dimensions of the objectives 
are greatly enlarged. It means tha t the whole range o f problems 
which we sometimes lump under the heading o f “ core city prob­
lems”—the whole range of racial relations problems—the whole 
range of problems arising in our international relations—are all 
problems whose solutions are part o f our quest for justice.
There are at least two im portant consequences which flow from 
this development. One is the degree o f unrest which we in the 
United States are experiencing— particularly am ong the youth of 
the country. The second is the necessity for some modification o f our 
processes o f legal education. Let me touch upon each o f these.
A few weeks ago, Judge Charles Wyzanski, Jr., published an 
article in the Saturday Review entitled, “ A Federal Judge Digs the 
Young” . It is a fascinating article, for it encompasses much of the 
subject m atter which permeates the so-called student revolt. Quite 
properly, he notes that “ Certain aspects o f the student revolt are 
much overrated by the commercial press and money-seeking ex­
ploiters: sex, drugs, and dress.” But he goes on with these com m ents:
So we are critical o f the young. Have they not far more reason to 
be critical o f us? And what have we done to get them on the right path 
from the beginning? Most of us were quite content to have them 
undergo a permissive kind o f education in which not only the quad- 
rivium and the trivium, but the whole core o f humanistic learning 
was not part o f their deep education. We allowed them pretty much, 
in their early primary and secondary stages, to have the kind of 
education from their schools and their peers which they wanted
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because we were not sufficiently convinced o f our own beliefs. And 
they knew it. We brought them up in a society in which we no 
longer believed in either the carrot or the stick. Nor did they.
He goes on later:
What is to be said about these young people plus and minus?
And those o f us who sit where we hear both sides or many sides 
o f the question know that truth is never (or almost never) all on 
one side. Let us give the young, first o f  all, credit for being right 
about their concern. They, at least, know that there can never be, 
in a growing society, a philosophy o f concensus. They realize, to 
return to Heraclitus, that “ strife is the source of all things” . Growth 
implies discord as well as advance. What the young care about is 
a deeper kind of democracy than most o f  us have been willing to 
accept.
The youth of the United States have deep concerns about many 
things but primarily they are concerned about the Vietnam W ar, 
about poverty, about race relations. And surely they have chosen 
most critical arenas for their concern. How often, in recent m onths, 
have we heard words such as these: “ The Vietnam W ar is an unjust 
w ar.” “ There is no justice when, in a society of unparalleled affluence, 
thirty per cent o f the families have incomes below the declared 
poverty level.” Or, “ The Negro has been too long denied justice 
in attaining his place in our society.”
Note, if you will, tha t the comments are all phrased in terms of 
“justice” . Those who utter them call, often in strident terms, for a 
quest for justice of m onum ental proportions. They call for more 
action in international relations until the force o f w ar is indeed no 
longer an acceptable m ethod for the settlement of disputes. To 
achieve just dealing o f men with each other is a goal not confined 
to the elimination o f force in settling claims for damage to person 
or property but one which extends to  the relations between masses 
o f people known as nations. Is it unwise to heed this call? Is it 
wrong to assume that such a question is indeed a question of 
“justice?” Have not lawyers, from time immemorial, claimed special 
competence in devising methods for the resolution o f disputes? Is 
not a prim ary objective of any legal system the substituting o f peace­
ful for forceful methods in such resolution? And would not success 
in this arena release resources o f large dimension which might be 
devoted to the cause o f prom oting humanistic values? Yes, there is 
unrest—unrest which springs from a quest for justice in international 
dealings.
And what may be said of poverty ? The depressing effects o f long- 
continued deprivation o f basic hum an needs are well documented. 
The vicious cycle of want, crime, ignorance, disease, strife and return 
to want has been observed, discussed, analyzed and reported, but 
the cycle has not been broken. Welfare systems have been tried,
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with ambiguous results and often with something less than whole­
hearted effort. Is it wrong to believe that we can devise a system 
which can both preserve the values o f incentive reward and guarantee 
a modicum o f distributive justice? Is there not a  way to harness public 
and private resources to this end, tha t hum an life may be enjoyed, 
and hum an spirit lifted as it can be? I have seen no prediction o f 
life in the twenty-first century which does not promise such capability. 
There remains the question of finding the com m on will to exploit 
that capability, and if unrest gives promise o f generating such a 
common will, may we not count it a blessing, so long as the methods 
do not destroy the fabric o f society.
And when one turns to  the problems o f race relations, there is 
an overpowering sense o f unrest in the United States. It is marked 
on occasion by violence. Politics today turns daily to the multiple 
questions which are unanswered. We debate the merits o f separatism 
and integration, and seek the values o f each. We spawn demagogues, 
both black and white, who contribute naught but noise. No city is 
untouched. N o university exists which is not re-examining its role.
This is an arena where, perhaps, we too often take refuge in a 
false concept o f “ equal treatm ent” . Judge Wyzanski, in the article 
referred to, spoke o f Mr. Justice M aule, a British Judge, who had 
before him a divorce case. At tha t time in England, one was free 
to get a divorce if he took a very expensive route through the courts. 
The petitioner was poor, and had remarried w ithout benefit o f 
divorce. Justice M aule said: “ It is the glory o f England tha t the 
law courts are open alike to the rich and the poor.” Judge Wyzanski 
comments: “ The glory o f the law which treats alike the rich and the 
poor is no glory.” I have heard it expressed in different language by 
one in a m etropolitan city who was called upon to defend the ex­
penditure o f a disproportionately high sum per pupil in a  ghetto 
elementary school. He put it this way: “ N othing is more unequal 
than equal treatm ent o f unequals.”  And if our society through 
economic and cultural mismanagement brings unequals to the doors 
of public schools, then equality requires differential activity.
Again, the quest for justice—just dealing of men with each 
other— has brought unrest. Perhaps those o f you who sit outside 
our boundaries can see more clearly than we the route to justice. 
If so, I hope we can listen to advice, for the quest will not be ended 
overnight.
And now I hope it is appropriate to turn finally to legal educa­
tion. The dedication here o f new facilities is, I am sure, only a 
physical manifestation o f an intellectual dedication to improved 
legal training. I cannot, o f course, speak for the needs in your 
country. But the demands in my adjoining country are fairly clear. 
Universities as a whole cannot solve society’s problems. One must
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agree, I think, with Professor John Dawson, o f the H arvard Law 
School, who has recently pointed out that “ there could be no 
greater disaster than for universities to become the instrum ents for 
direct political and social action, committed to specific programs 
that they themselves prom ote. If  they could be captured for this 
purpose, as a few dissenters now propose, they would quickly 
forfeit the independence and the freedom o f inquiry on which their 
mission completely depends. Some memories are short,”  he observes. 
“ G erm an universities in 1933 were occupied by storm troops, wear­
ing brown shirts, not blue jeans. The Germ an universities became 
instruments o f political and social action and served their masters 
well.”
N o, universities are not instruments for direct action. But 
within the university, there can be a dedication to keeping up the 
flow o f ideas, and to grappling with ideas responsive to the needs 
o f the society in which they live. And within the university, there 
is no more natural place for this function than in faculties o f law. 
This is the time-honored mission of the legal educator—to develop 
and test a host o f alternatives to force. To bring the weight o f reason 
to the solution of problems, however large, is commonplace to the 
law teacher.
The new dimension, however, (and o f course it is not totally 
new) is that which springs from the broadened concept o f justice. 
For today, the lawyer cannot confine his attention to knowledge of 
the legal system itself. He must, as never before, understand the 
political, social, economic and even the psychological world within 
which his legal system operates. The knowledge of sociologists is no 
longer largely irrelevant to his task. On the contrary, the several 
disciplines o f science, social science and the arts are filled with 
relevant data, with meaningful ideas, with knowledge o f why men 
and women act as they do. And if law is to devise a structure which 
will produce justice—which will help men deal justly one with 
another, then law must build upon that knowledge. The isolation 
o f the law school, which in my country has regrettably been factual 
in the past, is no longer tolerable. G reat strides have already been 
made, and it is now commonplace for the law faculty to contain 
(on a full o r part time basis) representatives o f other disciplines. But 
com m unication is still difficult, and sometimes non-existent. The 
effort must continue.
I suspect that the moving o f the faculty o f law from Saint John 
to Fredericton may have been motivated, in part a t least, by the 
felt necessity o f maintaining continuous and ever-deepening com ­
m unication with the full intellectual scope o f the University of New 
Brunswick. Surely such communication will be greatly facilitated 
by the physical nearness.
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There is also a new dimension o f legal training developing in 
the United States which is an outgrowth o f attention being given 
to the legal problems o f the poor. There are neighborhood legal 
clinics being established in many areas of the United States, and 
they are being m anned by young lawyers, youthful graduates, who 
are prepared to develop their skills in this practice. It is fair to say 
that the traditional legal education which many American law 
schools have supplied is not terribly good training for such practice. 
There is a level o f legal problem, a kind o f legal problem which in 
the past has often been ignored because o f the poverty of the 
claim ant, which is now being pursued with considerable vigor. 
Traditional law o f landlord-tenant, o r o f debtor-creditor is being 
re-examined with a kind of intensity that has not been known for 
some time. And lawyers are being asked to treat these problems 
with the same attention that one gives to areas which in the past 
have been deemed more significant. There is a need to find ways 
to achieve legal representation for the poor, and it may require 
a form of group practice somewhat unfamiliar to our profession. 
And, it must be done in a way which will preserve the sanctity and 
the personal nature of the lawyer-client relationship. Law schools 
are surely destined to provide the required training and the leader­
ship in developing the modes o f practice which will be needed.
Let me conclude, then, as I started. The “ Quest for Justice” is 
a never-ending search, and there is a continuous call for lawyers, for 
legal educators, and law students to join the search. The new facilities 
for a faculty of law here at the University o f New Brunswick will 
surely bring together those who will play their part in carrying on 
that quest.
T H E QUEST FOR JU STICE:
TH E ROLE O F TH E PROFESSION
Gerald E. Le D ainf
Our corporate responsibility for justice is a reflection o f the 
scope and relative im portance o f our role in society. It is not a 
narrow responsibility, confined to a particular area, such as the 
adversary process. It is the general responsibility o f citizens having 
critical influence as advisers and decision-makers throughout the 
legal order. U ndoubtedly, we have a special responsibility for the 
quality o f what may be called judicial justice—that is, the justice 
dispensed in our adjudicative processes. The philosophical basis of
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